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Summary  findings
Using  the 1992 Bulgarian  household budget survey,  * Income tax contributes significantly  to reducing
Bogetid  and Hassan analyze  the distribution of income  income inequality  at both the national and sectoral
and of the income tax burden by income and  (rural-urban)  le ecl,  as the poor pay a smaller share of
expenditure class and by rural-urban sector. They find:  taxes than their share of national income.
* Low income inequality (although that is changing  These results hold whether income or expenditure is
rapidly).  used as an indicator of economic well-being.
* A progressive  income tax system.  The poor (the  Bogetic  and Hassan  caution that as in-kind income
lowest  two-income  decile) pay only 1.4 percent of their  becomes  monetized and the economy becomes more
per capita income in income tax; the rich (the top decile)  market-oriented, the system will become less  progressive
pay nearly 6 percent. In-kind income and expenditures  and urban-rural differences  will diminish.
are excluded from taxation.  They contend that the bias toward higher urban taxes
* The urban sector paying proportionately more in  is justified  to some extent by the fact that urban
taxes than the rural sector. For example, urban  households  benefit more from government  services than
households  pay 5.3 percent of their per capita income in  rural households  do.
income tax, whereas the rural sector pays 2.4 percent.
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I.  Introduction
Under the previous centrally planned system in Bulgaria, taxes were but one, and
perhaps not the main instrument of massive redistributions.  Indeed, non-market pricing and
extensive explicit and implicit subsidies were equally important mechanisms for creating and
maintaining an economy based on the principle of extreme egalitarianism.  The shift to a
market economy, which in Bulgaria accelerated in 1991, changed all that.  Market-based
relative prices now guide most of the economic activity, private sector is a significant part of
the economy, and taxes are increasingly becoming similar in form and effects to those in
market economies'.
Furthermore, taxes are becoming an important characteristic of the overall economic
environment determining incentives to engage in economic activity, and level and
l/  For recent surveys of Bulgaria's market reforms see, for example, World Bank (1994a,b),
and European Commission (1994).2
composition of incomes.  But  there is an acuLte  lack of empirical analysis on the effects of
taxes in the course of economic transition.  Some exceptions include studies by Coulter,
Heady, Lawson and Smith (1993), and Milanovid (1992).  Partly, this is due to the fact that
in a rapidly changing environment, it is difficult to isolate a set of factors influencing a
naricular  phenomenon studied.  Nevertheless, as mere reliable data emerge, there is a need
to put them to use to analyzing and assessing tangible economic issues of the transition.  In
particular, household budget survey data, with all their shortcomings, can serve multiple
purpose of analyzing a host of distributional issues.
In this paper, we attempt to use the data on household income, expenditure, and taxes
from the most recent Bulgarian household budget survey to analyze the i'npacl of income tax
on household income.  The present income tax system with marginal rates ranging from 20
percent to 52 percent is the most important tax affecting the individual and household
financial positions.  Furthermore, we are interested in addressing questions such as these:
who pays income tax in Bulgaria? What proportion of households are paying most of these
taxes, and how progressive is the income tax?  Does the current tax system contribute to
achieving economic equality?  Finally, we also examined the effective tax rates paid by
households in rural and urban areas, as well as their distributional impacts.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides the background to the analysis
through a brief overview of the evolving tax structure and government revenue performance
in Bulgaria.  Section III describes the data and methodology, and section IV discusses the
income levels and income distribution.  In section V, we ask whether the present income tax
system is progressive.  The section provide estimates of the overall effective tax rates as well3
as sectoral  rates paid by urban and rural households. The section  also  discusses  implications
of the analysis  for the distributional  impact  of taxation. The conclusion,  section  VI,
summarizes  the main findings  of the study.
II.  Tax Structure and Tax Performance: A Brief Overview
Bulgarian  tax structure  and tax revenue  performance  have undergone  profound
changes  over the past several  years.  Much  of this change  is associated  with the unique
circumstances  of the economic  transition  from a centrally  planned  to a market  economy. The
transition  results, among  other things,  in the explosion  of new  private activity  and the
implosion  or stagnation  of many state enterprises  facing  restructuring  and privatization. This
poses formidable  challenges  to tax policy  and tax administration.  High taxes  on a heavily
controlled,  small  number  of state enterprises  become  unsustainable,  and are being replaced
by more moderate  taxes on considerably  larger number  of private  and state enterprises.
Given  the scarce  tax administration  resources,  this results  in a general  policy shift towards
simpler  tax structure  with lower rates.  Tax revenues  inevitably  fall.
The decline  in the involvement  of state  in the economy  is reflected  in the decline  in
the revenue-to-GDP  ratio.  In Bulgaria,  revenues  declined  from 43% of GDP in 1991  to
approximately  35% in 1993. Tax revenues,  particularly  profits tax revenues,  were the main
driving  force of this decline. The new set of market  based  relative  prices uncovered
financial  inviability  of many  enterprises. Furthermore,  many  enterprises  faced  an abrupt loss
of extemal  markets  associated  with the collapse  of the former Eastern European  trading  block4
(CMEA). At the same  time, there was weakening  of state control  over state enterprises,  in
the presence  of perverse  incentives,  which contributed  to a dramatic  deteroration in the
financial  position  of many state  enterpriscs. As a result, the profits tax base -- surpluses  of
state  enterprises  - and the associated  government  revenues  plummeted.  The percentage  of
revenues  from profits  tax, the key tax instrument,  dropped  from over 17%  of GDP in 1991,
to about 5% in 1993  (Table 1).
Tax reform necessitated  by the move to a market  economy  resulted  in significant
changes  in the tax structure. The pre-reform  Bulgarian  tax structure  was dominated  by the
extremely  high rate of 50% on "accounting  profits" of state enterprises 2, an archaic  final-sale
turnover  tax structure  with many rates, and non-transparent  social security  contributions.
These  three taxes accounted  for over two thirds of all government  revenues. Administrative
effort required  to collect  those  revenues  was modest. For the managers  of a relatively  small
number  of state enterprises  (around  6,000) directly  controlled  by the state-party  apparatus,
the costs of non-compliance  were high.
2/ The base for this tax had little to do with economic  profits. Subsidies  were counted  as
revenues, while important  expenditure  items  including  wages  and salaries,  interest  payments
and insurance  were not counted  as costs. Therefore, "accounting  profits" were much higher
than economic  profits. Additional  problem  in making  sense  of the pre-reform  profits of state
enterprises  was the fact that both input  and output  prices  were typically  controlled,  thus
further distorting  the picture  of true financial  position  of these enterprises.  For more
thorough  discussions  of the pre-reform  tax system  in Bulgaria,  see Bogetid  and Hillman
(1994)  and World Bank  (1991),  chapter  one.5
Table 1:  Tax Structure (1993)  and Government  Revenues  in Bulgaria
Type of Tax  Rates  Base  Revenue (% of CDP)
1991  1992  1993
Profits Tax  40% standard rate for  Profits of all SEs,  17.3  8.3  5.2
non-financial  enterprises.  MEs', and private
enterprises




below 1  million leva
Social Security  pension: 40%  Gross wage  7.8  9.1  8.4
contributions  unemployment:  7%
Income Tax  Marginal rates from  Individual income  3.8  5.4  4.8
20% to 52%
Turnover TaxIVAT  Standard rate: 22%  Retail turnover of all  3.8  3.5  3.8
(lower rates: 2%, 10%)  enterprises; lower
rates apply to food
and select sectors
(construction)
VAT (1994) Single rate:  Value added of
18%  goods and services
Excises and customs  Ad valorem excise rates  Turnover of select  4.8  4.6  6.2
vary from 35% (diesel  goods
fuel) to 70% (alcohol,
jewelry)
Non-tax revenue  Various fees, charges on  select public services  4.8  7.5  6.2
services
Total  Total  Total
42.3  38.3  34.6
SEs denotes state enterprises, MEs denotes municipal enterprises.  Municipal entexprises  and state enterprises
with more than 50% municipal participation in ownership were liable for an additional 10% tax On profits
payable to their municipalities. Source: Bogetid and Hillman (1994), World Bank (1994a), and Tax Notes
Internauional  (1993).6
Following  the comprehensive  price liberalization  of 1991,  at a time when the
economy  was subjected  to a series of severe  external shocks 3, the mirage.  of "accounting
profits" disappeared,  leaving  many state  enterprises  in the red.  By 1993,  the revenue
significance  of profits tax, levied  at the reduced  rate of 30%, fell behind social  security  tax,
excises  and customs,  and non-tax  revenues. After the turnover  tax rate structure  had bee.i
considerably  simplified  and base broadened,  it was replaced  by a Value  Added  Tax with a
single 18% rate in 1994. With the general shift in the emphasis  from mandatory  to voluntary
compliance,  a progressive  income  tax with marginal  rates ranging  from 20% to 52% gained
more prominence. Revenues  from income  tax as a share of GDP rose by 25 percent between
1991  and 1993,  compared  with a sharp  decline  (about  70 percent)  in revenues  from profit
tax.
Against  this background,  distributional  effects  of the emerging  tax system in Bulgaria
are far from clear and are not, to our knowledge,  systematically  analyzed. Yet, in the
emerging  market  economy,  understanding  distributional  effects  of taxation  may be of
particular  interest for policy. In this paper, we therefore  attempt  to provide  a preliminary
analysis  of the effects  of income  tax on the distribution  of income,  using  the household
budget survey  data.  It is hoped that quantitative  picture  of the often  poorly  understood
distributional  effects  of taxation  will provide  the basis for better tax policy  analysis  and tax
design  in Bulgaria  as well as in other economies  in transition.
3/ These  include  the loss of traditional  external  markets  of the former  CMEA countries,  the
impact  of the Gulf War, the severed  trade routes to the West due to the disintegration  of the
former Yugoslavia,  and the subsequent  U.N. sanctions  against  Federal  Republic  of
Yugoslavia  (Serbia  and Montenegro).7
m.  Data and Methodology
The analysis  is based  on the most recent household  budget survey: the 1992  Individual
Budgets  of Households,  compiled  by the National  Statistical  Institute  (NSI) of Bulgaria. The
sample  was constructed  as a two-tier  random  sample,  involving  2,202 households  (or less
than 1 percent  of households). Of these 2,202 households,  1,386 households  (or 63 percent)
are urban, the remaining  are rural.  It is based  on a sample  frame developed  from the 1985
Population  Census. The sample  was constructed  from a sample  of 418 sectors  or Census
districts: each district  contains  about 90 households  and 6 households  were sampled  from
each sector.'  Each household  was paid a nominal  amount,  Leva 100  per month  (about
US$4.00), for participating  in the survey. According  to the officials  of NSI, the sample  was
"random",  and it adequately  represented  the incomes  and expenditures  of the Bulgarian
population'.
The pattern of effective  tax rates, i.e., whether  they are progressive,  regressive  or
proportionate,  depends  not only on the distribution  of tax burdens, but also on the concept  of
income  which is used to determine  the underlying  pattern  of income  distribution.  The concept
of income  employed  in the NSI survey  includes  seven  major sources of pre-tax income  -
earned income,  property  income, social  insurance,  social  benefits,  income from sales, other
4/The sample  of 418 sectors were taken from a 'control' sample  of 4,000 sectors which was,
in turn, taken  from the 1985  Population  Census  of 40,000 sectors, including  approximately,
3.2 million  households.
51 Nevertheless,  it appears  that some minorities,  particularly  gypsies, were probably  under-
represented  in the sample.8
sources  of income (mainly  in-kind  income),  and income  from loans, credits and savings.
Some  of these sources,  such  as income  from sales of property,  borrowing  and saving
withdrawals  do not belong  to the usual  definition  of income.  The inclusion  of these sources
can potentially  alter the income  distribution  in Bulgaria,  as would  be expected  from the
concenmration  of assets (real and financial)  in the richest  group. However,  even when  these
sources  are included,  the overall  picture  of the distribution  of income  in Bulgaria  is not
significantly  affected 6. Although  in-kind  income  accounts  for  about 24 percent of household
income  and was counted  as part of income,  only cash income  was subject  to taxation.
Ultimately,  total consumption  must  be regarded  as a more  reliable  indicator  of household
well-being  than annual  income.  As Nissen (1984)  noted,  it reflects  not only current total
household  income  but also past savings,  windfalls  and expectations  of future income,  i.e.,
expenditure  is a better proxy  of lifetime  income.  More important,  Poterba (1991)  in his
examination  of the regressiveness  of the US gasoline  tax uses both household  expenditure  and
_/ To assess the effect that such an inclusion  might  have  on income  levels  and income
distribution,  Hassan  and Peters (1994)  make  a number  of adjustments  to income  as defined
by the survey. First, sales of property  are excluded,  as they do not belong to income.
Second,  contrary  to the NSI definition  of income,  personal  borrowing,  savings  withdrawal,
etc., are also excluded.  Theoretically,  one should  include  income  that would  be received  if
an asset were rented - rather than sold - in the marketplace  instead of being used by the
owner. However,  in practice,  making  this distinction  is extremely  difficult.  In general,
income  is not easily  observable  and measurable,  especially  during  periods of radical  changes
in the structure  of remuneration  and taxes, inflation,  and rapid  changes  in the structure  of the
economy  (such  as the public/private  mix, growing  informal  rctor,  reliance  on self-
employment  and so on.).  Altering  the definition  of income  leads only to a change  in the
level of household  income  per capita.  However,  none of the adjustments  mentioned  above
significantly  affect the decile  shares or income  inequality  as both adjustments  result in a very
small  change  in the shares of all income  groups. These  results  indicate  that asset sales were,
in general,  evenly  distributed  across the population,  and not highly  concentrated  in any
income  group.9
income  data and concludes  that this tax appears far less regressive  when  cxpenditure  rather
than income  is used  as the basis for analysis.  Of course, year-to-year  fluctuations  in income
among  poor households  may exaggerate  the regressiveness  of taxes. Following  Poterba's
warning  regarding  the use of income,  we have used in our analysis  of tax  burden uolh
income  and expenditure  approaches.
The income  unit which  corresponds  with the income  concept  employed  in the
Bulgarian  survey  is the household. The household  concept  adopted  in the survey includes  a
one-person  household,  one family  household,  and a household  of more than one family  that
makes  common  provision  for food  or other essentials  for living. This definition  corresponds
closely  to the definition  of the 1980  World Population  Census  Program  (United  Nations,
1978).  To acuount  for variation  in the household  size, we shall  use in our analysis  the
wumal  household  income  per capita.  Finally, the consideration  of household  composition
requires  the use of an adult equivalent  scale.  The construction  of such a scale is fraught  with
a number  of conceptual  and practical  difficulties 7. Hence, the calculation  of such  a scale has
not been  attempted  for this paper.
Our analysis  uses a partial equilibrium  method  for estimating  the distribution  of tax
burdens.  That is, taxes on factor income  such as the income  tax are taken  to affect household
positions  from the sources  side only (the burden  being distributed  in line with earnings
subject  to tax). Further effects  from the uses sides, resulting  from changes  in relative  prices
are not taken  into account. However,  if each income  group spends  the same  proportion  of its
7/The literature  on the best procedures  is controversial  see, for example,  Deaton  and
Muellbauer  (1980)  and Ravallion  (1992).10
income  on the taxed  and untaxed  commodities,  it is possible  to disregard  the uses side. This
partial equilibrium  approach  has been used widely  for policy analysis  and for assessing  the
quality  of the tax structure  in distributional  terms for many  countries.  The examples  of these
studies  include  that of the U.S. (Musgrave  et al. 1951, Musgrave  1965), and the subsequent
studies  of Colombia  (McLure 1971), Greece  (Karageorgas  1973)  and Tanzania  (Huang
1976).
A more complete  analysis  of the effects  of taxation  that takes  into account  secondary
effects  mentioned  above  requires a general equilibrium  approach.  With all its difficulties,
only few studies  (e.g., Harberger 1962,  McLure 1975, Fullerton  et al. 1979,  and Devarajan
et a.  1980)  attempted  to combine  the uses (demand  for goods  and services)  and sources (of
income)  sides of tax burden, within  the standard  general  equilibrium  framework.  Devarajan
et al. (1980), in their comparison of different approaches, developed  a simple, two-sector,
two-consumer  model  and compare  its implications  with the estimation  of the distribution  of
tax burdens  derived  for the U.S. by Musgrave  et al. (1965)  on the basis of a partial
approach.  Even for this simple  general equilibrium  model,  the general expression  for the
changes  in the distribution  of tax burdens  is fairly complex,  and a wide range of results are
possible.  Nevertheless,  Devarajan  et al. have  identified  two parameters  which might  reverse
the partial  equilibrium  pattern: the capital-labor  ratio of the taxed  industry  and the capital-
intensity  of a consumer's factor  endowments.  However,  the two-sector,  two-factor  model
oversimplifies  the process  of substitution  which affects  both sources  and uses sides.!
A/ In his pioneering  paper on the incidence  of the corporate  income  tax, Harberger  (1962)
also uses a two-sector,  two-factor  model  which  is commonly  used  in the theory  of
international  trade.11
Finally, Devarajan et al. also compared the results of the Fullerton et al. (1979) model with
estimates  of the partial  procedure  for four tax changes  and three tax substitutions  in the
United  States. They conclude  that the two approaches  yield strikingly  similar results for the
case of the income  tax. In other cases, the similarity  is greater for taxes on products whose
capital-labor  ratios are close to the average.  It is worth mentioning  that general  equilibrium
tax burden models are built on neoclassical assumptions.  These include, inter alia, the
assumption  of perfectly  competitive  markets  with no externalities;  that factors of production
are perfectly  mobile  between  different industries;  and that the total supplies  of all factors are
in perfectly  inelastic  supply  to the economy  as a whole.
A crucial assumption  employed  in our partial  equilibrium  method  is that the
distribution  of a tax burden  which initially  affects  household  income from the sources (uses)
side will be determined  fully  by the sources' (uses)  side effects.  Furthermore,  our analysis
does  not capture  other features  which are especially  relevant  to the analysis  of tax burden,
such as variations  in capital-labor  ratios in production  activities,  variations  in ratios of
consumer  factor endowments,  and longer-term  effects  of tax policy through  changes  in the
level of capital  formation  and growth. These simplifying  assumptions  could be modified  in
more sophisticated  future analyses.  At the same  time, the difficulties  (and, sometimes,  non-
transparency)  involved  in worldng  with more complex  models  should  be weighted  against  the
pitfalls  of over-emphasizing  a single  dimension  of tax burden problems.  Nevertheless,  it is
important  to start by focusing  on the analysis  and interpretation  of the available  data using a
simple  analytical  framework,  such as the one employed  in this study.12
IV.  Income Levels and Income Distribution
Ideally,  tax policy  analysis  and reform proposals  should  be based upon estimates  of
the distribution  of income  and the burden of existing  taxes. Knowledge  of how equally (or
unequally)  income  is distributed  is essential  to the-  determination  of the desired  degree  of
progressiveness  (or regressiveness)  of the tax system. If the distribution  of income  is already
extremely  unequal,  a regressive  tax system  would  impose  even higher burden  on the poor
and lower  income classes,  while  a mildly  progressive  tax system  would not tap the tax
revenue  potential  of those  in the top income  classes 9. Moreover,  without  knowledge  of the
effective  tax rates,  it is not possible  to know whether  and how taxation  corresponds  with a
country's views of the concept  of equity. In general,  the level of income  in a nation  is
probably  an important  determinant  of society's  views  of equity.
In Bulgaria,  household  incomes  have fallen  significantly  in real terms during  the
transition. GDP has fallen  by nearly 30 percent, since 1989  when the political  transition
began (World  Bank, 1994a;  Rose, 1993). A recent UNICEF  (1994)  study  indicates  that
household  incomes  have  probably  fallen  by roughly  the same amount. One should  caution,
however,  about comparing  household  incomes  since the onset  of the transition,  because  of
dramatic  changes  in the structure  of income  and taxation  over tie past few years.
Nevertheless,  it is safe to say that most households  have  suffered significant  income  losses
and many face increased  uncertainty  over their future  incomes.
2JThe classic  study  by Kaldor (1963)  made  a similar  argument  for progressive  taxation  in the
context  of the Latin American  countries.13
Using  the 1992  household  survey, average  household  income  per capita  is estimated  at
Leva 16,809,  about US$ 709 (see Table  2).  The average household  income per capita  in the
rumral  sector  is Leva 19,151  (about  US$ 808), and it is 26 percent  higher than the urban
average  (Leva 15,090  or about  US$ 637). Furthermore, for each income  decile, rural
household  income  is higher than urban one (see  Table 2).  The difference  in income  levels
between  the two sectors  is statistically  significant.
Income  distribution  is measured  by groups (decile,  quintiles,  etc.) ranldng  households
by their income/consumption  expenditure. The distribution  of household  income  per capita
by income  decile  is shown  in Table 2.  The Gini coefficient,  an index measuring  the
inequality  of income  distribution,  which is equal  to zero in the case of perfect equality  and to
100  percent  in the case of total inequality,  is 25.8 percent. While the Gini index in a typical
middle-income  country  had ranged  between  40 and 54 percent, in Central and Eastern
Europe  it oscillated  between  20 and 29 percent,  i.e., values even  lower than those  prevailing
in Western  market  economiesel.  This comparatively  low income  inequality,  although
changing  rapidly, is still an important  characteristic  of most economies  in transition.
Table 2 shows  that the rich (top decile)  receive  nearly 22 percent  of total income,  a
share  that exceeds  their population  share  by more than 50 pent.  In contrast, the poor (the
bottom  20 percent)  receive  less than 10 percent of total income,  i.e., a share that falls short
of their population  share by about 50 percent. Another  way of viewing  the concentration  of
income  in the upper income  groups is to calculate  the decile  distribution  ratio, that is, the
share  of the bottom  40 percent  in relation  to the share of the top 20 percent. Table 2
10/ Hassan  and Peters (1994).14
indicates that the decile distribution ratio is 0.66,  indicating that the poorest 40 percent of
households earn only two thirds of the earnings of the top quintile. While income levels vary
significantly between urban and rural areas, both the analysis of income shares by decile and
Gini coefficients indicate that there is no significant difference between them in terms of
income distribution (see Table 3). We note that the fact that income inequality is not
significantly different between urban and rural areas is unusual for countries at Bulgaria's
level of income.
Table 2:  Distribution or Annual Household Income Per Capita (%, Leva)
National  Urban  Rural
Income  Share  Average  Share  Average  Share  Average
Decile  (%)  (Leva  (%)  (Leva)  (%)  (Leva)
Bottom  4.2  6,941  4.5  6,816  3.8  7,507
Second  5.6  9,361  5.9  8,882  5.6  11,020
Third  6.5  10,900  6.7  10,101  6.6  13,037
Fourth  7.4  12,387  7.6  11,359  7.5  14,789
Fifth  8.3  13,928  8.4  12,654  8.5  16,622
Sixth  9.3  15,643  9.4  14,095  9.5  18,663
Seventh  10.6  17,778  10.5  15,844  10.5  20,856
Eight  12.1  20,380  12.1  18,192  12.0  23,608
Ninth  14.3  24,121  14.4  21,598  14.2  28,265
Top  21.8  36,653  20.7  31,357  21.8  42,784
Average  16,809  15,090  19,151
Table 3: Indicators  of Income Inequality  in Bulgaria  (National Average, Urban,  Rural)
Indicators  of Ineqality  National  Urban  Rural
Decile Distribution  0.66  0.70  0.65
Ratio  ___________________________________________  _____________________
Gini Coefficient  j  25.8  24.6  26.5
Source  (tables  2-3): Authors'  estimates  from the 1992  Indvidual Budgets of HiouiseholR  Suney,  NSI.15
V.  Overall and Sectoral Income Tax Burden
Using  both income  and expenditure  measures,  households  are first assigned  to deciles
of income  or spending  distribution.  The effective  rate of income  tax -the ratio of income
(expenditure)  taken  by income  tax- is then calculated  for each income (expenditure)  decile
(see  Table 4).  Whether  this ratio rises or falls (or is constant)  as income (expenditure)  rises
determines  whether  the tax system  is progressive  or regressive  (or proportionate). Table  4
shows that low-income  households  display markedly  lower income  tax-to income  ratios than
higher-income  households. For the bottom  income  decile  this ratio is as small as 1.4
percent.  Also the poor (lowest  two deciles)  pay a similar  ratio.  The table shows  a
relatively  smooth  rise in the share of income  devoted  to income  tax, to 2.5 percent at the
fifth income  decile  . For the higher-income  households  (7 to 10 decile)  the  percentage  of
per capita income  paid in income  tax rises sharply  with income.  For instance,  the rich (top
income  decile)  pay more than four times higher  effective  income  tax rate than the poor.
Table 4 also shows  the fraction  of household  per capita  exenditure devoted  to income
tax for households  grouped  by total expenditures".  Similar  pattern of tax burden  emerges.
Households  in the lowest  expenditure  decile  devote 1.6 of their budget to income  tax,
compared  with 3.2 percent  for those  in the fifth decile. The rich (highest  expenditure  decile)
devotes  7.2 percent of outlays  to income tax, or more  than four times  the amount  paid by the
poor.
1 /In-ldnd consumption  which was not subject  to tax, was counted  as part of total
incomelexpenditure.16
Figure 1 graphs  the two sets of effective  income  tax rates: income-based  and
expenditure  -based  rates for all households.  Two features  of the figure  are noteworthy.
First, the distributional  pattern  of income  tax does not differ in the two cases. The
percentage  of per capita  income  (expenditure)  paid in income  tax rises consistently  with
income  (expenditure).  Irrespective  of the approach  used, income  tax falls most heavily  on
higher-income  (expenditure)  households  -decile  7 to 10-  with effective  rates nearly four times
that of poor households  (lowest  two decile). These  results suggest  that the present income
tax system  with marginal  rates ranging from 20 percent to 52 percent  is very progressive.
Furthermore,  the exclusion  of in-kind  income/expenditure  eliminates  much  of the share
income  (expenditure)  of the poor from taxation,  increasing  the progressivity.  Second,
although  the effective  income  tax rates  based on expenditure  are higher  than those  based on
income,  the figure  shows that the variation  in expenditure  shares  across  deciles is the same  as
the variation  in income  tax outlays  as a share of income  1
The urban and rural effective  income  tax rates for each income  (expenditure)  decile
are also given in Table 4.  Urban  households  pay 5.3 percent  of their per capita  income  in
income  tax, whereas  the rural sector  pays less than half that amount.  The table shows that
the percentage  of per capita  income  or expenditure  devoted  to income  tax is much higher  for
the urban  sector than the rural one. This urban-rural  disparity  in income  tax burden  cuts
across income  as well as expenditure  classes. The disparity  is due, among  other things, to
12/ Surprisingly,  the household  budget  survey  data show  that household  per capita
expenditure  is, on the average,  lower than  per capita  income.  For  an economy  in transition
such as Bulgaria,  one would  expect  a significant  fraction  of households  to experience
transitory  low income, or have  expenditure  in excess  of income  as part of a lifetime  plan.17
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the exclusion  of in-kind  income/expenditure  from taxation.  Such  exclusion  greatly reduces
tax burden  estimates,  particularly  in the  mral  sector  where in-kind  income/expenditure  is
more common:;. The "urban  bias' in tax burden,  however, can be justified  on equity
grounds  as there appears  to be a wide belief across the country  that public services  have not
been equally  distributed  among  urban and rural areas.  In particular, social  and
infrastructure  expenditures  were lower  in rural areas with the capital  of the country  having
the loin's share.
/3JHuang's  (1976)  study  of the distribution  of the tax burden in Tazania  concluded  that
the role of in-kind  consumption  is extremely  important  and partally explains  why the tax
system  is both progressive  and urban bias.18
Table 4:  Effective Income Tax Rates Under Alternative  Approaches
Income\  National  Urban  Rura
Expend.  T/Y  T/E  T/Y  T/E  TIY  T/E
Decile  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)
Bottom  1.35  1.58  1.51  1.68  0.96  1.25
Second  1.36  1.62  1.64  1.83  1.03  1.48
Third  1.74  2.13  2.29  2.54  1.03  1.57
Fourth  2.03  2.54  2.59  2.93  1.15  1.75
Fifth  2.53  3.19  3.51  3.94  1.53  2.40
Sixth  3.56  4.50  5.28  5.82  1.80  2.78
Seventh  4.32  5.50  5.96  6.40  2.46  3.87
Eight  4.86  6.12  6.01  6.60  3.02  4.75
Ninth  5.62  6.93  7.28  7.74  3.28  5.12
Top  5.82  7.15  7.82  7.93  3.63  5.60
Average  4.06  5.03  5.31  5.73  2.42  3.72
T=n-m  axpi,Y  household  per capita ncomei  anT=per  capita expenditure.
Source: Authors' estimates using 1992 Individual Budget of Households Survey, NSI.
Table 5:  Percentage  of ]Income Tax Paid  by Income Decile
Income  decile  National  Urban  Rural
Bottom  1.38  1.40  1.51
Second  1.86  1.67  2.35
Third  2.79  2.89  2.82
Fourth  3.69  3.68  3.53
Fifth  5.20  5.52  6.30
Sixth  8.16  9.31  6.01
Seventh  11.26  11.83  10.65
Eighth  14.53  13.57  14.96
Ninth  19.86  19.68  19.24
Tenth  31.27  30.46  32.63
Total  100  100  100
Poor (lowest  2  3.24  3.07  3.86
d ec ile  )  I__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  I__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Source: Authors' tabulations using 1992 Individual Budget of Households.19
Finally, we assess the distributional  impact of income  tax at the national, urban  and
rural level, by posing  the question  whether  the poor and other lower income classes  pay a
smaller share  of total income  tax than their share of national  income.  In such a case the
income  tax system  is judged to be pro-poor,  as it reduces income  inequality. Table 5
presents  information  on the percentage  of income  tax paid by each  income decile  at  the
national  level, urban and rural level. Lorenz  curves in Figure 2 further illustrate  the nature
of the distribution. Combining the information  in Tables  2 and 5 indicates  that the poor as
well as the lower middle  income  groups (up to the 6th income  decile),  pay a smaller share  of
income  tax than their share of national  income. While the poor (bottom  two decile) for
instance,  pay about 3.2 percent  of total income  tax ( or less than  one third of their income
share) the top income  class share  of tax is 31.3 percent (or more than 50 percent  of their
income  share). These results  are furither  confirmed  by Figure  2 which shows that the Lorenz
curve for income  tax lies far below  the income  curve for the entire income  spectrum. Thus
the current income  tax system  contributes  significandy  to reducing  income inequality. This
positive  distributive  effect  of income  tax applies  to both the urban and rural sector (see
Tables  2 and 5 and Figure  2).
Interestingly,  overall,  urban households  are found  to pay smaller share of their total
taxes  paid than rural households. However,  the difference  is not significant. This applies  to
the nual poor (the lowest  two deciles)  and urban  poor as well. This conclusion  confirms  the
insignificant  difference  in the income  distribution  between  urban and rural sector.20
In sum  the current income  tax system  seems to be progressive  and urban bias.
Furthermore,  it contributes  significantly  to reduce overall  and sectoral  (urban-rural)  income
inequality.
[FIGURE 2 APPROXIMATELY  HERE]
VL  Conclusions
This study  has made  use of the most recent household  budget  survey  to determine  the
distribution  of the overall and sectoral  (urban-rural)  income  and income  tax burden in
Bulgaria. The distributional  impact  at the national,  urban and rurl  level of the present
income  tax has also been examined.
The findings  indicate  that Bulgaria  is characterized  by low income  inequality,  though
this is changing  rapidly. while income  levels vary significantly  between  urban and rural
areas, both the analysis  of income  shares  by decile  and Gini coefficients  indicate  that there is
no significant  difference  between  them in terms of income  distribution  .
The analysis  suggests  that the present  income  tax system  is significantly  progressive
as the percentage  of income  paid in tax rises with income.  For instance,  the poor (the lowest
two income  decile)  pay only 1.4 percent  of their per capita income  to the government  in
income tax, whereas  the rich (top decile)  pay nearly 6 percent  effective  tax rate.  The
distributional  pattern of the tax burden  remains  unchanged  when  household  per capita
expenditure  rather than per capita  income  is used as a base for calculating  the effective  tax
rates.  This similarity  between  income  and expenditure-based  burden  estimates  cuts across21
income and expenditure classes as well as types of residence (urban-rural).  The
progressiveness of the income tax is due, among other things, to marginal tax rates ranging
from 20 percent to 52 percent and this is accentuated  by the exclusion of in-kind
income/expenditure from taxation.
The study also found that the present income tax system has an obvious "urban bias".
For example, urban households pay 5.3 percent of their per capita income in income tax,
whereas the rural sector pays 2.4 percent (or less than half the urban amount).  This urban-
rural disparity in income tax burden cuts across income as well as expenditure classes. It
should be noted that the exclusion of in-kind incometexpenditure from taxation reduces tax
burden estimates, particularly in rural areas where in-kind income/expenditure is more
common.  The urban bias, however, can be justified on equity grounds.  To the extent that
urban households are enjoying more govemment services per capita, this higher tax burden
seems to at least partially offset the urban bias of the public services favoring urban
residents.
The progressivity and urban bias in Bulgaria, however, must be viewed cautiously
since it is obvious that as in-ldnd income becomes monefized, and the economy more market-
oriented, both progressivity and urban/rural difference will be substantially reduced over
time.
Finally, the distributional effects of income tax are also assessed.  We raise the
question whether the poor and other lower income groups pay a smaller share of income tax
than their share of national income.  In such a case the tax system is judged to be pro-poor
as it reduces the pre-tax income inequality.  It is found that the present income tax system22
contributes  significantly  to reducing  income  inequality  at both national  and sectr%ral  level, as
the poor (as well as the lower  middle  income  groups up to the 6th decile)  pay a smaller share
of taxes than their share  of national  income. Ultimately,  concerns  over the equity  of tax
policies  should  motivate  future  studies  that examine  the whole  tax system  rather than the
specific  tax analyzed  here.23
References
Bogetid,  ±ejko and Aryq  L. Hillman  (1994).  'The Tax Base  in Tnusition: The Cue of Bulgaria",  Communist
Economie and Economic  Trantfornation,  forthcoming;  also, World  Bank Working  Paper No.  1267,
March 1994.
Coulter,  Fiona, Christopher  Heady, Colin  Lawson  and Smith  (1993). 'Simplifying  tho Czechoslovak  Personul
Income  Tax', Prague  Economic  Papers,  No.2, 131-146.
Deaton,  A. and J. Muellbauer  (1980)  Economics  and Consumer  Behavior,  Camnbridge,  Cambridge  University
Pes.
Devaajan, Shantayaan., Don Fullerton  and Richard  A. Musgmve  (1980).  'Estimating  tho Distribution  of Tax
Burdens:  A Comparison  of Different  Approdaes', Journal  of Public  Economics,  13, 155-182.
European  Commission  (1994). 'Bulgaria:  Structural  Reform  and the  Transition  to a Masket  Economy', paper
prepured  for the high level  G-24  meeting,  Brmssels,  May 20.
Fullerton,  Don., A. T. King,  J. B. Shoven  and John  Whalley  (1979)  'Corporte and Personld  Tax Integntion in
tie U.S.: Some  Prelimina  Findings  From a General  Equilibrium  Analyis',  in R. Haveman  and K.
Hollenbeck  (eds.), Microconomic  Simulation,  Institute  for Research  on poverty,  Madison,  Wisconsin.
Harberger,  Amold C. (1962), 'The Incidence  of the Corporate  Income  tax', Jounal of Poltical Economy,  70,
215-240.
Hassn, Fareed  and R. Kyle Peters, Jr. (1994)  '  The Structure  of Inconms  and Social  Protection  During  the
Transition:  The Case of Bulguris',  World  Bank, Europe  and Centrml  Asia  One, Country  Operations,
mimeo.
Huang, Yukon (1976) 'Distribution of the Tax Burden in Tanzania'  Economic  Journal, Vol 86, March 1976,pp
73-86.
Kuldor,  Nicholas  (1963). 'Will Underdeveloped  Countries  Lmen  to Tax?' Foreign  Affairs, vol.41, 410-19.
Karageorgas,  D. (1973).  'The Distribution  of Tax Burden  by Income  Groups  in Greec',  Economic  Journal,
83, 436-448.
Lewis, W. A.(1955) 7he 7heoiy  of Economic Growth, Homewood, m Ricbard D. Iwin,  p. 379.
Milanovic,  Branko  (1992). 'Income Distribution  in Late Socialismn  Poland,  Czechodovakia,  Yugoslavia  and
Bulgaria  Compared' World  Bank  Research  Paper Series (Research  project 'ncome Distribution  During
the Transition',  Socialist  Economies  Weform  Unit),  No.1, March.
McLure,  Charles  E. (1971)  'The Incidence  of Taxation  in Colombia',  in Mwgrave,  R. A. and M. Gillis  (ed.)
Fiscal  Reform  for Colombia,  Harvard  University  Press. 14, pp. 239-266.
McLume,  Charles  E. (1975)  "General  Equilibrium  Incidence alysis:  The Hruberger  Model  After Ten Years',
Journal  of Public  Economics,  14, 125-161.24
Musgrave, Richard A. et  al. (1951). "Distribution  of Tax Payments  by Income Groups: A Case Study for
1948w,  National Tax  Journial,  4, 1-53.
Musgrave, Richard A. et al. (1965). 'Estimuting the Distribution of the Tax Burden", in Joint Tax Progamm,
Problems of Tax  Administration  In latin America, John Hopkins Press, 31-90.
National Statistical Institute (1992). Individual  Budgets of Householdr,  Sofia, Bulgaria.
Nissen, Hans-Peter (1984) (ed). Towards  Income  Distributioni  Policies: From Income Distribution  Research to
Income Distribution  Policy in LDC's, European Association  of Development  Research and Training
istitute, book series 3, Tilburg University.
Poterba, James M.(1991) 'Is the Gasoline Tax Regressive  ?" in David Bradford  (1991) (ed.) Tax Policy and the
Economy, National Bureau of Economic  Research, The MIT Press, Cambridge.
Ravallion, Martin (1992) "Poverty  Comparisons:  A Guide to Concepts and Methods", Living Standards
Measurement Study Working Paper, No. 88, The World Bank, Washington  D. C.
Rose, Richard (1993). "Contradictions  Between  Micro- and Macro-Economic  Goals in Post-Communist
Societies". Europe-Asia  Studies, vol.45, No.3, 419-444.
Tax Notes International  (1993). Issue of May 10, 1993.
United Nations (1978) "Draft Principles and Recommendations  for Population  and Housing Censuses", Studies
in Methods, Series M, No. 110, New York.
UNICEF (1994). Public Policy and Socidal  Conditions,  Regional  Monitoring Report Number 1, Florenc . ettly.
World Bank (1991). Bulgaria: Crisis and Transition  to a Mar/e: Economy, World Bank Country Study,
Washington  D.C.
World Bank (1994a). Bulgaria: Public Finance  Refoms  in the Transition,  Report No. 12273-Bul,  World
Bank, Washington D.C.
World Bank (1994b). Bulgaria. An Economic Update, Report for the World Bank\EU\G-24  meeting, Brusses,
May.25
igure 2 (a). Disirbution  of household  pFer  capia  nxome  and incore  tuc
100  ...... *.....-----  *----,----------,---  --  ---  --- *------  ---------  ------  -s------oo@  -
90  ,,,,,,,..  ...................  ........  . -----  ......  ......  ...----  --------- ,  -------- ,-~  ........ 
70  -------------  .t........-----..........  :--
60  a  i  *  a~~~~~;  ;  *~
bO  ..  r~~~~~~----  -*-  -v----~----$-- - --  ^w-  --- --
20  *  '*  *.. 60
1  0  ~~~~~~~~~-  ------ 5---------4--------  ----------- 1------  -- 4
0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  1  00
Prcent of househlds
Line  oi equality  Tot;A  Income  Income  lax
Figtwe  2(b). Dislribution  dt urban household  per capita income  and income
tax
100 - :  :  .-.--------------------------------------  ---
80  ----  ---  --------
70  ------  -- ---  .------  - ---------  -------  -- *--------1  60 tttt.. 
50,..,,.  4.
40  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~........  ....  -;y------------;-  ,  4  0
30  -.----------------  -
20  --
10 - *  a  a-------  ,------------------  T----------------
0
0  1  0  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
Percent  of households
Une  of equality  Total  income  Income  taxRgure 2(c). DisinIion  of  rural  household  per capia income  and  income  law
1*00  --------  ''------'------'  ------ '  ------ '------'------'------'------  T-T-T-
go  ...........  ........  .........  ---.---- *--  ........  ---  -----.....  -*--  ---  j9  -
80  -_  -----  ...........-.......  .-........  ......-
70  - - - ------- I---------  --------- t---------'---------I--------------  ------ i
So ._  ------  r------  --------  -------  ......  .....  _------_-___-
40  .------------------ *-  ----- ,--
30  ___..___..._'......._........_____________.
20.___---.  a
10  ---------  --  --  -- T-4---------  4-----  --- 4
0  10  20  30  40  60  60  70  80  90  100
percent  of  hou9hds
Unh  of  equality  Total  income  Income  taxPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Serles
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1397 Are Private  Capital  Flows to  Uri Dadush  December  1994  J. Queen
Developing  Countries  Sustainable?  Ashok Dhareshwar  33740
Ron  Johannes
WPS1  398 The Cost  of Air Pollution  Abatement  Raymond  S. Hartnan  December  1994  E. Schaper
David  Wheeler  33457
Manjula  Singh
WPS1399 How Important  to India's  Poor  is the  Martin  Ravallion  December  1994  P. Cook
Urban-Rural  Composition  of Growth?  Gaurav Daft  33902
WPS1400 Technical  and Marketing  Support  Brian  Levy with  December  1994  D. Evans
Systems  for Successful  Small and  Albert Berry, Motoshige  Itoh,  38526
Medium-Size  Enterprises  in Four  Linsu Kim,  Jeffrey Nugent,
Countries  and Shujiro  Urata
WPS1401 Colombia's  Small  and Medium-Size  Albert Berry  December  1994  D. Evans
Exporters  and Their Support  Systems Jose Escandon  38526
WPS1402 Indonesia's  Small  and Medium-Size  Albert Berry  December  1994  D. Evans
Exporters  and Their Support  Systems Brian Levy  38526
WPS1403 Small  and Medium-Size  Enterprise  Motoshige Itoh  December  1994  D. Evans
Support Policies  in Japan  Shujiro Urata  38526
WPS1404 The Republic  of Korea's  Small  and  Unsu  Kim  Decernber  1994  D. Evans
Medium-Size  Enterprises  and  Their  Jeffrey B. Nugent  38526
Support Systems
WPS1405 Growth  and Poverty  in Rural India  Martin Ravallion  January 1995  WDR
Gaurav Datt  31393
WPS1406  Structural  Breaks  and Long-Run  Javier Le6n  January 1995  R. Luz
Trends  in Commodity  Prices  Raimundo  Soto  31320
WPS1407 Pakistan's  Agriculture Sector:  Rashid  Faruqee  January 1995  F.  Willie
Is 3 to 4 Percent  Annual  Growth  82262
Sustainable?
WPS1408 Macroeconomic  Management  and  Jun Ma  January  1995  C. Jones
Intergovemmental  Relations  in  37754
China
WPS1409 Restructuring  Uganda's  Debt:  Kapil  Kapoor  January  1995  E. Spano
The  Commercial  Debt  Buy-Back  35538
Operation
WPS1410 Macroeconomic  Effects  of Terms-  Nikola  Spatafora  January  1995  J. Queen
of-Trade  Shocks:  The  Case  of Oil-  Andrew  Warner  33740
Exporting  CountriesPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS1411 Income Inequality,  Welfare,  and  Nanak  Kakwani  January 1995  G. Evans
Poverty: An Illustration  Using  85783
Ukrainian  Data
WPS1412 Foreign  Technology  Imports  and  Xiaoming  Zhang  January 1995  C. Jones
Economic  Gro.iAh  in Developing  Heng-1u  Zou  37754
Countries
WPS1413 Endogenous  Distortions  in Product  Martin  Rama  January 1995  S. Fallon
and Labor Markets  Guido Tabellini  38009
WPS1  414 The World Bank  and Legal  Technical  The  World Bank  January 1995  K Mathemova
Assistance: Initial Lessons  Legal  Department  82782
WPS1415 China's  GDP in U.S. Dollars  Based  Ren  Ruoen  January 1995  E.  O'Rielly-Campbell
on Purchasing  Power  Parity  Chen Kai  33707
WPS1416 Informal Regulation  of Industrial  Sheoli  Pargal  February 1995  E. Schaper
Pollution  in Developing  Countries:  David  Wheeler  33457
Evidence  from Indonesia
WPS1417 Uncertainty  and Global  Warming:  An  Andrea  Baranzini  February  1995  C. Dell
Option-Pricing  Approach  to Policy  Marc  Chesney  85148
Jacques Morisset
WPS1418 The Impact  of Labor  Market  Lyn Squire  February  1995  G. Bayard
Regulations  Sethaput Suthiwart-  37460
Narueput
WPS1419 Industry Structure  and Regulation  Martin  C. Stewart-Smith  February  1995  N. James
82758
WPS1420 Legislative  Frameworks  Used  to  William  T. Onorato  Febrtary 1995  W. Onorato
Foster  Petroleum  Development  81611
WPS1421 Distribution  of Income  and the Income Zeljko Bogetic  February 1995  F. Smith
Tax Burden  in Bulgaria  Fareed  M. A. Hassan  36072
WPS1422 Efficiency  in Bulgaria's  Schools:  Zeljko Bogetic  February 1995  F. Smith
A Nonparametric  Study  Sajal  Chattophadyay  36072
WPS1423 The Role  of Commercial  Banks  in  Millard  Long  February 1995  R. Gamer
Enterprise  Restructuring  in Central  Izabela  Rutkowska  37670
and Eastem  Europe